|
|
Post by creature386 on Jun 26, 2014 18:54:04 GMT 5
I am using a more relevant definition of person to ethical debates. Under your definition Yoda or Elrond would not be persons even though they have far more ethical relevance if they exist than a brain dead coma patient. Maybe a good definition for this form of personhood would be: A creature capable of mental agency comparable to or exceeding that of a human child. You use an if scenario. In the real world, there are simply no lifeforms that are non-human that we would consider as "persons" in the classic sense. That doesn't mean I believe pets are worthless, I just don't see the point of bringing up fictional characters to prove something. |
|
|
|
Post by coherentsheaf on Jun 26, 2014 19:50:43 GMT 5
I am using a more relevant definition of person to ethical debates. Under your definition Yoda or Elrond would not be persons even though they have far more ethical relevance if they exist than a brain dead coma patient. Maybe a good definition for this form of personhood would be: A creature capable of mental agency comparable to or exceeding that of a human child. You use an if scenario. In the real world, there are simply no lifeforms that are non-human that we would consider as "persons" in the classic sense. That doesn't mean I believe pets are worthless, I just don't see the point of bringing up fictional characters to prove something. First thing to note here that given the probability of alien intelligence your existence assertions are absurd. The point of bringing up inadequacies of definitions is that it is very clear that this definition i.e. human being makes very little sense i ethical discurse. I gave an example why. |
|
|
|
Post by creature386 on Jun 26, 2014 22:07:14 GMT 5
By persons in the classic sense, I meant unlike the usual portrayal of fictional characters who are normally extremely human like, while extraterrestrial intelligence is probably more abstract than what we can imagine.
Secondly, it is possible to broaden a definition, by including both. Without saying that your definition is useless, there are some points in favor of theropod's. These are simply that it is natural to care more about the own species, this is what other highly social animals do as well. This is one of the reasons why I believe we should accept that humans are not better than animals, but not necessarily behave that way.
|
|
|
|
Post by coherentsheaf on Jun 26, 2014 22:44:32 GMT 5
By persons in the classic sense, I meant unlike the usual portrayal of fictional characters who are normally extremely human like, while extraterrestrial intelligence is probably more abstract than what we can imagine. Complete conjecture and given that alien minds would have been shaped by evolution very unlikely to be true. For the context of ethical debate I think this is very unlikely. Just because we instinctualy care more does not mean it is correct t do so. Our moral intuitions are faulty. |
|
|
|
Post by theropod on Jun 26, 2014 22:47:22 GMT 5
To me a person would primarily be a member of my own species. I’ve got no problem with including other sentient lifeforms though, that just again throws up the question where to draw the line? Only elves and minbari or also corvids and apes? But in terms of ethics, I don’t see a difference regarding the topic at hand, because we are just discussing humans anyway (at least until dolphin abortions start to get media attention or some lost manuscript by tolkien turns up  ). So, from where does a human take the right to end the life of another member of its own species? That is not natural behaviour (for humans), it causes harm (to the child), and it hence certainly isn’t right to do so without a damn good reason. Convenience or probabilities don’t count as valid reasons imho. |
|
|
|
Post by coherentsheaf on Jun 26, 2014 22:53:22 GMT 5
To me a person would primarily be a member of my own species. I’ve got no problem with including other sentient lifeforms though, that just again throws up the question where to draw the line? Only elbs and minbari or also corvids and apes? But in terms of ethics, I don’t see a difference regarding the topic at hand, because we are just discussing humans anyway (at least until dolphin abortions start to get media attention or some lost manuscript by tolkien turns up ). So, from where does a human take the right to end the life of another innocent member of its own species? The point is that species membership alone is not enough to qualify ethically the interesting point is sentience. For example if you had absorbed a twin of yours and the only remnant of his existence would be a few oles on your body that shared his dna, this patch of skin would qualify as livig member of our species but this is not enough to give it moral significance. |
|
|
|
Post by theropod on Jun 27, 2014 0:51:31 GMT 5
A fetus is a natural ontogenetic stage, an absorbed twin is not. An absorbed twin will never be an independant, sentient lifeform, it will never develop normally, while a healthy fetus will.
That makes the absorbed twin more comparable to a braindead patient for example.
Again, where do you draw the line? Children after they are born also don’t have the same degree of sentience as an adult, does that make their lifes worth less than adult lifes?
|
|
|
|
Post by coherentsheaf on Jun 27, 2014 1:51:28 GMT 5
A fetus is a natural ontogenetic stage, an absorbed twin is not. An absorbed twin will never be an independant, sentient lifeform, it will never develop normally, while a healthy fetus will. What is the ethical distinction between the two states? (My ethical system utilitarianism concerns itself with the wellfare of conscious beings not with the proliferation of states of affairs tat lead to the existence of such) Yes, I think both are comparable. I draw the line where consciousness becomes more pronounced. This is a empirical question when this happens, but I think current laws are fine in so far as they have a net benefit, so I do not obsess over the exact moment. If I would have to save one over the other I would probably go for a young adult over a newborn child. |
|
|
|
Post by theropod on Jun 27, 2014 17:49:37 GMT 5
…and fetus is rather comparable to an unconscious person. That doesn’t make its life worthless.
|
|
|
|
Post by coherentsheaf on Jun 27, 2014 18:21:27 GMT 5
…and fetus is rather comparable to an unconscious person. That doesn’t make its life worthless. No, a fetus does not have a brain that is able to produce the phenomen called consciousness. This is the vital difference, so your analogy does not hold. |
|
|
|
Post by theropod on Jun 27, 2014 20:44:25 GMT 5
I don’t see any ethically relevant difference at all.
Both are not conscious at the moment but have the potential to become conscious. At that moment neither is "able to produce the phenomenon called consciousness", otherwise they would be doing that exact thing.
But both can be conscious in the future, so it is still the life of a conscious being we are talking about either way.
That’s why species membership in the context of ontogeny is absolutely sufficient to qualify a person for me.
|
|
|
|
Post by coherentsheaf on Jun 28, 2014 1:33:55 GMT 5
I don’t see any ethically relevant difference at all. Both are not conscious at the moment but have the potential to become conscious. At that moment neither is "able to produce the phenomenon called consciousness", otherwise they would be doing that exact thing. Ok, then I amend my argument to the ethically relevant category of structures that have the principal ability to produce consciousness( to an amount defined above)but are in a state of current indispostion that can be fixed by repair. I did not give this distinction beforehand because similar nitpicks have arisen in the past and the complete definition I would need for my definitions would mostly exceed margins of internet debates. Possibility of future consciousness is not obviously ethically relevant. The collection of atoms you are made of had this possibility within them, nevertheless I would not consider actions that would have changed their configuration in their past so as that you would not have been produced to be in principle unethical. |
|
LeopJag
Member
Panthera kryptikos (cryptic, evasive panther)
Posts: 440
|
Post by LeopJag on Jun 28, 2014 11:09:03 GMT 5
In some regards i'm prochoice, while in others i'm prolife....and on both ends of the spectrum i do believe that some people take it too far and are too fanatical about it imo... i voted prochoice within reason btw. personally in the end i put the life of a fetus and over ahead of that of a zygote or an embryo.
The non-human great apes have been legally granted personhood in some EU countries (elephants too i think) which i think is a really good thing personally.
|
|
|
|
Post by theropod on Jun 28, 2014 13:47:42 GMT 5
And why is a structure that is in current indisposition but can be fxed by repair better than one that is in current indisposition but will fix itself through ontogeny? Who exactly decided what is ethically relevant?
But they do not have the certainty, baring accidents.
|
|
LeopJag
Member
Panthera kryptikos (cryptic, evasive panther)
Posts: 440
|
Post by LeopJag on Jun 29, 2014 1:09:59 GMT 5
|
|
).
